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Recent Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-UNFAIR COiPETITION-MULTIPLE BASING
POINT PRICE SYSTEM HELD ILLEGAL
The Federal Trade Commission ordered the Cement Institute,
an unincorporated trade association, corporate producing members
and associated individuals to cease and desist from concerted action
in employing a multiple basing-point system in the sale and dis-
tribution of cement. Held, (6-1) order upheld; the system as used
constituted an "unfair method of competition" and a "systematic
price discrimination" between customers of the respondents. The
former is a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT.
719, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1946) ; and the latter is a violation of the Clayton
Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §13 (f) (1946), as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §'13 (1946).
Mr. Justice Burton dissented. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement
Institute, 68 Sup. Ct. 793 (1948).
A multiple basing formula is similar to the single-base system
known as "Pittsburgh plus", restrained as a violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. United States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924).
Delivered prices were quoted on steel consisting of Pittsburgh "base
price" plus "all rail" freight from Pittsburgh to delivery point,
regardless of the origin of shipment. "Mill net" return of the
seller varied depending upon cost of shipment compared with the
"all rail" freight charge in the delivered price. Excess of charge
over cost was termed "phantom freight" and the converse "freight
absorption." Interdiction of the single system resulted in a shift to
a multiple system in many industries. THE BASING POINT PROBLEM
11, 31 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941). Multiple systems embrace two
or more geographical areas, each with a basing point. For ship-
ments outside an area, the lower delivered price of the two areas
involved is quoted. Cement Institute, 37 F.T.C. 87, 147-48 (1943).
Standardized product and elasticity of demand from the point
of view of the individual producer characterize the cement indus-
try. Transportation charges are important in costs, as are fixed
charges. Producers are localized in few geographic areas with high
concentration of purchases in few consumers. WILcox, COMPETIToN
Am MONOPOLY IN AmERIcAN INDUSTRY 126 (TNEC Monograph 21,
1940).
It is significant that in this case (1) a combination was charged,
(2) competition between the sellers was considered restrained, and
(3) uniform price quotation resulted, denoting use of base price
plus base point freight charges.
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In two leading cases, relied upon by the Court, individual use
of a single basing-point system was held discriminatory with ac-
companying restraint of competition between purchasers. Corn
Products Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726 (1945);
Federal Trade Commission v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
During debate an amendment was proposed to the Robinson-Pat-
man Act which would have made the word "price" as used in Sec-
tion 2 of the Act mean "mill net" and thereby outlaw any system
using basing-point freight. H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936). This was stricken. 80 CONG. REc. 8224 (1936). At the same
time the Wheeler Anti-Basing Point Bill was rejected. 80 CoNG.
REC. 8102, 8223-24 (1936). As a result, a basing-point system must
meet the same statutory requirements as any other pricing system.
The Corn Products case, supra, left the validity of a multiple
system for future scrutiny, but only in that it might meet the
"good faith" provision which permits reduction in price to certain
purchasers if "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of
a competitor." Such sufferance applies only to the seller's "lower"
price and not to an entire system of which part may be a "good
faith" reduction. See Federal Trade Commission v. Staley Mfg. Co.,
supra at 753. It was considered that these rulings made further
application of Section 2 a matter of detail. Wooden, Section.2(a)-
Its Application to Basing Point Delivered Price, ROBmnSON-PATMAN
ACT SYMPOSIUM, CCH (1948).
Restraint or threatened restraint on either "primary" or "sec-
ond line" competition, or variations thereof, violate Section 2. Foi
differentiation of types of competition, see Haslett, Price Discrimi
nations-and Their Justifications under the Robinson-Patman Act
46 MICH. L. REv. 450, 454 (1948). Before amendment, also, the sec
tion applied to either. Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co.
278 U.S. 245 (1929); Porto-Rican American Tobacco Co. v. Ameri
can Tobacco Co., 30 F. 2d 234 (C.C.A. 2d 1929). "Freight equaliza
tion" whereby prices are quoted f.o.b. mill and certain purchaser
were credited on invoices with differences between the freigh
which such purchasers were required to pay and freight from th
nearest competitor of the seller, has been restrained. Milk & Ic
Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade Commission, 152 F. 2d 47
(C.C.A. 7th 1946). Restraint, however, was under the Feder.
Trade Commission Act alone, and because of a combination. Th
same Act outlawed a "uniform delivered price" system and a "zon
delivered price" system. United States Maltsters Ass'n v. Federc
Trade Commission, 152 F. 2d 161 (C.C.A. 7th 1945); Ft. Howar
Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. 2d 899 (C.C.A. 7t
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). "Concert of action" w,
found in each case.
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The suggestion of these cases is that "concert of action" makes
a price formula illegal where there is freight absorption without
direct phantom freight charges, since the cost of such a system
must be borne by a "padded" base price. They would fail in the
face of the Federal Trade Commission Act and could not meet the
"good faith" proviso of the Robinson-Patman Act. A basic reason
for this may be that concerted action in maintaining a basing-point
system, coupled with the use of a uniform base price, is price fixing.
Concerted price fixing, even where agreed prices thereunder are
reasonable, is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-25 (1940).
It is submitted that this decision does not illegalize all "de-
livered price" quotation, though they may be economically un-
feasible if not outlawed. To bring individual use of such plans
within the proscription there must be a specific adoption of the
"mill net" theory and reciprocal grant of a right in the purchaser
to have the advantage of his geographical location. A price with
"full freight added" would not be suspect unless charges were for
"all rail" freight and a cheaper form of transportation was used in
certain discriminatory instances. Individual use of a "zone deliv-
ered price" formula, wherein zones were drawn to conform with
optimum competition points with sellers in other zones and where
there was no substantial competition between purchasers inter-
zone, would meet the requirements. Again, individual use of
"freight equalization" may be justified as a method of meeting
competition where the same restrictions are met. Conceivably in-
dividual adoption of a "multiple basing-point" plan might be
within the permitted area where it did not tend to restrain com-
petition among purchasers.
Whatever ill effects may be laid to the force of this decision in
the way of placing heavier burdens on consumers in certain areas
and forcing eventual decentralization, it is difficult to oppose a
consequent cessation of the uneconomical costs of cross-hauling in
an industry where transportation costs constitute one-fifth of the
delivered price.
Max Harley
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EXECUTIVE DETERMINATION
OF ELECTORAL LAWS
Appeal to the supreme court from a certification of the Secre-
tary of State that the Ohio Wallace for President Committee was
not entitled to a position on the 1948 presidential ballot. Held, re-
versed. There is no substantial evidence in the record to justify a
denial of a position on the ballot to this group on the basis that its
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affidavit was deficient because three of the affiants belong to the
Communist Party. Without showing that they personally advocate
the overthrow of the government the validity of the affidavit is not
impaired. Zahn v. Hummel, 150 Ohio St. 127 (1948).
"Any party, or group, desiring to have a place on the ballot
shall file with the Secretary of State of Ohio . . . an affidavit ...
under oath stating that it does not advocate.., the overthrow,...
of our local, state, or national government. . . ." Omo GEN. CODE
§4785-100 (a) (1939). The statute is phrased in terms of "party" or
"group" and not in terms of the political tenets of the individual
affiants. The personal political affiliations of individuals of a group
would not necessarily establish a connection between the group and
the activities prohibited by the statute. The court straddles this in-
terpretation of the statute by stating ". . . the statute we are con-
sidering provides that the group must not advocate... overthrow
... of our government. . .", and "The fact that three members of
the group belong to the Communist Party ... without any showing
• . . they personally advocate overthrow of our government . . .
does not destroy or impair ... the affidavit ... ." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Zahn v. Hummel, supra 136, 137.
The constitutionality of the statute might have been attacked
as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. The elective franchise is embodied in the Ohio Con-
stitution, Article V, Section 1. This creates a substantive righ
comparable to other basic liberties guaranteed by the constitution
and therefore, entitled to due process. The Fourteenth Amendmenl
demands adequate notice and a fair and impartial hearing. Powel'
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S
421 (1932). There must be a notice and a hearing, however sum.
mary, at some stage in the proceeding. Hager v. Reclamation Dis
trict, 111 U.S. 701 (1884). A hearing carries with it an opportunit
to present evidence. Sanders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917). Thi:
right extends to all tribunals and officers empowered to perforn
the judicial function. State ex rel. Oregon R.R. v. Fairchild, 22,
U.S. 510 (1912); Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. United States, 298 U.E
349 (1936). The limitation would apply to a secretary of state.
On the affidavit in question, an appeal is provided from the find
ing of the secretary of state. OHIO GEN. CODE §4785-100 (a) (1939)
There is no provision for a hearing of the controversy concernin
the affidavit at any stage. Under the wording of the statute, a fina
determination of the question could be made without an oppox
tunity to call a witness or present evidence. Such a determinatio:
would seem to deny due process of law as guaranteed by the Foul
teenth Amendment, but the court rejected this approach statin
"We do not hold in the present case the secretary was obligated t
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have a hearing or to give opportunity . . . to answer any charges
... or to cross examine any witnesses ... ." Zahn v. Hummel, supra
139.
"An order [of an executive or administrative agency] based
upon a finding made without evidence ... or upon a finding made
upon evidence which clearly does not support it,... is an arbitrary
act against which courts afford relief." Northern Pacific R.R. v.
Washington Department of Public Works, 268 U.S. 39 (1925). Exec-
utive or administrative action cannot be constitutionally freed from
the basic requirement that it be supported by a reasonable
foundation in fact. Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 256
N.Y. 199, 176 N.E. 141 (1932), affd per curiam, 284 U.S. 594 (1932).
An administrative determination not supported by a reasonable
foundation in fact is void. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
It would seem that the Ohio court accepted this approach when it
stated ". . . but we do hold that there must be in the record of in-
vestigation by the secretary substantial facts or evidence to over-
come the presumption of the good faith or honesty of an afflant
whose affidavit fully complies upon its face with the provision of
section 4785-100 (a) *General Code... ." Zahn v. Hummel, supra, 139.
There exists in our jurisprudence a constitutional guaranty
of minimal requisites essential to fair executive hearings and the
executive determination which follows such hearing must have a
demonstrable basis in evidentiary fact.
On theory it may be argued that these two constitutional re-
quisites are in fact components of a single guaranty. On this ration-
ale, rejection of the first component and the acceptance of the sec-
ond, as was done in this case, would be acceptance of but half of
the guaranty.
It may also be said that the requisites are in fact two separate
guaranties. It would seem that the court based its decision on the
less important of the two.
On either analysis an equitable result was reached.
Robert L. Perdue
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN A STATE,
NONCAPITAL, CRIMINAL CASE
Bute pleaded guilty to the noncapital crime of "taking indecent
liberties with children" and was sentenced to one to twenty years
in the state penitentiary. Eight years later, by proper procedure,
Bute perfected his appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
maintaining that there was a denial of due process of law in his
trial in that he was not represented by counsel, that the court did
not inquire into his desire to have counsel or his ability to procure
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counsel, and that the court did not offer or assign counsel to assist
him. Held, (5-4) the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not require the state court to make inquiries or to offer
or to assign counsel in this case. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948).
About two months later the Supreme Court held (6-3) that
there had been a denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment in the sentencing by a state court of the accused upon
a plea of guilty to burglary and robbery, a noncapital case, because
the petitioner was without counsel (although he did not request
counsel, he did not waive counsel, nor did the court make any in-
quiries as to his desire for counsel), and because of gross careless-
ness in the court's sentence which was based on materially untrue
assumptions concerning the petitioner's criminal record. Townsend
v. Burke, 68 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1948). And in another decision handed
down the same day as the latter case, the Supreme Court decided
(5-4) that there had been a denial of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment where the accused, who was found guilty in a
jury trial of breaking and entering, a noncapital crime, had been
denied appointment of counsel which he had requested. The ac-
cused was a youth 18 years old and incapable of adequately repre-
senting himself. Wade v. Mayo, 68 Sup. Ct. 1270 (1948).
The Sixth Amendment gives the right to counsel in criminal
cases in federal courts whether the accused requests it or not. John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). There is no such specific amend-
ment applicable to criminal cases in state courts. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked to give this
right of counsel in state criminal cases where the offense is a
capital one. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945). But the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937).
The concept of due process has not been set in a rigid pattern
but has been kept fluid so as to permit the rendition of justice in
varying circumstances. Embodied in the concept of due process is
the right to a fair trial of which there are several aspects, right to
counsel in certain instances being one. It is generally conceded
that the right to retain private counsel is present in all cases; the
problem arises as to the right to have counsel appointed to assist an
indigent accused.
Although the right to appointed counsel in state courts has been
limited to capital cases, the way is open to recognize this right in
noncapital cases as evidenced by the following language, "That
which may in one setting constitute a denial of fundamental fair-
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ness, shocking to the universal sense of justice may, in other circum-
stances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such
denial." Betts v. Brady, supra. In the Townsend case the fact that
the accused was not represented by counsel plus the fact of gross
carelessness by the trial court constituted denial of due process of
law in a noncapital case. And in the Wade case the fact that it was
a noncapital case did not automaticlly close the court's mind to the
need for counsel. The court held that the accused's youth and in-
ability adequately to represent himself, made the right to appointed
counsel prerequisite to a fair trial.
The court has broken away from the test which required that
there must be a capital case before the right to appointed counsel
arises. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in the Bute case, would look
to the nature of the charge and the ability of the average man to
defend himself, unaided by the expert at law, to determine the need
for counsel, upon that need would base the right. But the court has
not adopted Mr. Justice Douglas' test; rather it has eliminated as an
independent criterion, the requirement of a capital offense and it
now looks to the facts of each case to determine whether there is a
circumstance which aggravates the disadvantage arising from ab-
sence of counsel. The death penalty alone is still sufficient to create
the right to counsel; there may be that right in cases of much less
serious crimes. The court now applies a subjective test, looking at
the facts and circumstances, of each individual case. State courts
must now enforce a rule more difficult to apply. Federal courts may
have more litigation on this question than formerly. The cases do,
however, recognize an important need and a vital civil right. This
could have been accomplished and the law could have been more
settled by a decision that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment embraces the Sixth Amendment. Perhaps state courts
will react to these cases so as to accomplish substantially that result.
Jack W. Folkerth
DEscENT A DISTRIBUTION - DESIGNATED HEIR
An illegitimate child was acknowledged in the natural father's
will. The natural father also designated the child as his heir at
law under the provisions of Ohio General Code Section 10503-12.
Plaintiff as guardian of the child brought an action to contest the
will of the brother of the natural father, which brother died sub-
sequent to the decease of the natural father. The trial court was of
the opinion that the child could inherit from the natural father's
brother as from a blood uncle. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, but on the ground that a designated
heir is entitled to inherit through as well as from the declarant.
Held, the child was not a proper party to contest the will since
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
acknowledgment by the natural father without marriage to the
mother does not enable the child under the statute of descent and
distribution to inherit either from or through the natural father,
and because a designated heir under the statute of descent and dis-
tribution can inherit only from, not through, the designator. Black-
well v. Bowman, 150 Ohio St. 34 (1948).
In derogation of common law, at which an illegitimate child is
nullius filius and cannot inherit from anyone, in Ohio an illegitimate
child can inherit both from and through his mother, either directly
or collaterally. OHio GEN. CODE §10503-14 (1938). No Ohio law pro-
vides for an illegitimate child's inheriting from his natural father
under the statute of descent and distribution. Lewis v. Eutsler, 4
Ohio St. 355 (1854). However, the child may be legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents and the father's acknowledg-
ment of paternity. OHio GEN. CODE §10503-15 (1938). Being unable
to inherit from the acknowledged father, clearly the child cannot
inherit through him on the ground of blood relationship. The court
pointed out that if this is too harsh a doctrine, the remedy is a leg-
islative problem.
In Ohio adoption after majority is invalid and confers no right
of inheritance. Steele v. Schwartz, 55 Ohio St. 685, 48 N.E. 1118
(1896). Ohio General Code Section 10503-12 provides, without age
restrictions and without consent or knowledge on the part of the
designee, for the designation of any individual by the designator as
his heir at law. The statute states that when this is properly done,
"the person thus desig nated will stand in the same relation for all
purposes, to such declarant as he or she could, if a child born in
lawful wedlock. The rules of inheritance will be the same, between
him and the relations by blood of the declarant, as if so born." This
statute was first enacted in 1854 and has been carried into every
revision and codification since then with no substantial change.
It is believed that there has never been another statute similar to
this in any other state or country basing its jurisprudence on com-
mon law. Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyer, 66
Ohio App. 136, 31 N.E. 2d 161 (1940). Notwithstanding the broad
language of the designated heir statute and the provision of Ohio
General Code Section 10214 that the rule of common law to the
effect that statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly construed
has no application to the third or remedial part of the, code, the
courts have consistently held that the effect of the designated heir
statute was merely to give the designated heir a share in the de-
clarant's estate upon his death. Southern Ohio Savings Bank &
Trust Co. v. Boyer, supra; Rogers v. Cromer, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 508,
37 N.E. 2d 407 (Ct. of App. 1937).
Prior to 1946, the Ohio courts uniformly held that the most that
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was conferred upon the adopted child was the right to inherit from,
never through, the adopting parent. Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655
(1880); Quigley v. Mitchell, 41 Ohio St. 375 (1884); Phillips v. Mc-
Conica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898); Albright v. Albright, 116
Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927). These cases followed the weight
of authority in the United States. 15 CiN. L. REv. 347 (1941). In
interpreting the designated heir statute, the court followed the doc-
trine of pari materia and the adopted child ruling was used along
with the argument that the designated heir statute could not confer
greater rights on the designated heir. Southern Ohio Savings Bank
& Trust Co. v. Boyer, supra; Rogers v. Cromer, supra. In 1946 the
supreme court decided that under Ohio General Code Section
10512-19 an adopted child could inherit through as well as from the
adopting parent. Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E. 2d 75
(1946). This decision was based on the addition to the statute on
January 1, 1932, of the words: "[The adopted child] . . . shall be
capable of inheriting property expressly limited by will or by opera-
tion of law to the child or children, heir or heirs at law, or next of
kin of the adopting parent or parents or to a class including any of
the foregoing." While Flynn v. Bredbeck, supra, did not overrule
the former decisions as to the adopted child, being based on the
change in the statute, it nevertheless removed the limitation on the
adopted child's inheritance that had been used by analogy to pre-
vent the designated heir from inheriting through the designator.
In the principal case the court decided that the sentence, "The
rules of inheritance will be the same, between him and the relations
by blood of the declarant, as if so born," referred to the manner in
which the designee will stand as to the property of the declarant.
This interpretation completely nullifies that sentence as part of the
statute, as it then does nothing but add emphasis to the provisions
of the sentence preceding it. In the construction of statutes useless
repetitions of meaning are not to be supposed if they can be fairly
avoided. 37 OIo JuR. 616 (1934).
The court then posed the question, "If the designee inherited
from and through the declarant as a child of declarant born in
lawful wedlock, would it not follow that the designee would trans-
mit inheritance to the declarant?" An affirmative answer to that
question would be a complete non sequitur. It would seem clear
that this statute could not have been intended to permit an in-
dividual by the ex parte proceeding therein provided to become the
heir of another by self-declaration. No cases have been found
claiming such an interpretation. If no rights are created in the de-
clarant as a result of the designee inheriting from the declarant, it
would appear that similarly no rights need be created in the de-
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clarant by an interpretation that the designee may inherit from
persons other than the declarant.
Will the reasoning of the principal case affect inheritance from
the adopted child? It has been held that the personal estate of an
adopted child who died intestate passed to the natural mother to the
exclusion of the adopting parents. Upson v. Noble, supra. If the
reasoning of the court has any validity, it would seem now to open
the question whether an adopted child transmits inheritance to the
adopting parents beyond the specific provisions of the adoption
statute.
While the case is significant in that it settles an existing conflict
among the courts of appeals, it is submitted that the court's reason-
ing fails completely to reconcile differences between inheritance
under the adoption code and inheritance under the designated heir
statute.
Howard Crown
DIVORCE-CONFLICTS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT FOR DIVORCE
DECREES-SURVIVAL OF SEPARATION DECREES
Margaret Sherrer left Massachusetts, the state of matrimonial
domicile, went to Florida where she rented living quarters, found
a job, and placed her eldest daughter in school. At the end of the
ninety-day Florida residence requirement, she filed a bill of com-
plaint for divorce, alleging that she was a bona fide resident of the
state of Florida. Respondent received notice by mail and entered
a general appearance by Florida counsel, denying the allegation of
Florida residence. The petitioner presented evidence tending to
establish her Florida residence. Although respondent appeared per-
sonally he offered no evidence in rebuttal. An absolute divorce
was granted the petitioner on November 29, 1944. Three days later
she remarried and returned to Massachusetts. In June, 1945, re-
spondent instituted suit in Massachusetts alleging that he was pe-
titioner's lawful husband and that the petitioner's subsequent mar-
riage was void. He sought a declaration that he was living apart
for justifiable cause and that he be permitted to convey his real
property as though he were single. The Massachusetts probate court
found for the respondent and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts affirmed. On writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, reversed. A decree in a divorce proceeding
of one state wherein the question of jurisdiction has been litigated
by the parties is entitled to full faith and credit and may not later
be attacked collaterally in the courts of another state. Sherrer V.
Sherrer, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087 (1948).
In a companion case to Sherrer v. Sherrer the facts differed in
three material respects. The wife brought an action to enforce a
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decree for separate maintenance entered by a Massachusetts court
prior to the Nevada divorce decree. The wife admitted as true the
allegations in husband's divorce petition that he was a bona fide
resident of Nevada, and the divorce in controversy was granted to
the wife on her cross-petition. Held, that these differences did not
militate against the result reached in the Sherrer case. The Nevada
divorce is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Massa-
chusetts. Coe v. Coe, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1948).
Two other cases have modified the concept of full faith and
credit to be accorded divorce decrees. A husband and wife were
married in New York and maintained a marital domicile there.
The wife obtained a New York separation decree and was awarded
alimony, the husband appearing personally in the action. The hus-
band subsequently went to Nevada and obtained a final divorce
after satisfying the residence requirements. No provision was made
for alimony although the Nevada court was cognizant of the New
York decree. The wife was served constructively, and did not ap-
pear in the Nevada proceedings. No further alimony was paid
under the New York decree and the wife brought a suit for arrears
in a New York court. At no time has. she contested the Nevada
residence of her husband. The New York courts gave judgment
for the wife. On writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court, held, affirmed. The Nevada divorce is entitled to full faith
and credit in New York but the New York judgment survives the
decree. Estin v. Estin, 68 Sup. Ct. 1213 (1948); Kreiger v. Kreiger,
68 Sup. Ct. 1221 (1948).
The Constitution requires that the judgment of a state court
be given the same effect and validity in the courts of a sister state
as it would be given in the courts of the state where rendered.
The full faith and credit clause has been uniformly construed to
extend to divorce decrees. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U.S.
1858); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), 325 U.S. 226 (1945), rehearing denied,
325 U.S. 895 (1945). But if the court has no jurisdiction, the pro-
ceedings are coram non judice and neither courts of that state, nor
courts of any other state need recognize the judgment. A judgment
in personam is not entitled to full faith and credit unless the court
has jurisdiction of the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877). However, a divorce decree is not a judgment in personam.
It has been said to be a judgment in rem. For a criticism of this
characterization see Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit
Clause; Its History, 39 ILL. L. REv. 1, 24 (1944). Marriage is a status
out of which arise duties to society and to the other spouse, and
an action to dissolve a marriage can properly be called an action
quasi in rem. Therefore, a court can enter a valid decree although
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it does not have personal jurisdiction of the defendant. Maynard
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155
(1901). Such a decree is entitled to full faith and credit although
there was constructive service upon the defendant. Cheely v. Clay-
ton, 110 U.S. 701, 705 (1884). The essential requirement for juris-
diction to grant a divorce is domicile. The Supreme Court first
decided that a state could grant a valid divorce only if the marital
domicile of the parties was in that state. Further, contrary to the
general rule, the marital domicile did not follow the husband when
he was the party at fault, but remained with the wife. Haddock
v. Haddock, supra. Domicile followed the innocent party. Davis
v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). The present view is that fault of the
party suing is immaterial. It is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ment of domicile that he be a bona fide resident of the state where
suit is brought. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
In view of divergent requirements prescribed by the states,
the question of the bona fides of the residence of the petitioner is
of paramount importance. If a divorce is secured from a defendant
not personally served who did not appear in the proceedings, he
may collaterally attack the decree in another state by showing
that the petitioner was not a bona fide resident of the state grant-
ing the divorce, and since jurisdiction did not exist, the decree is
not entitled to full faith and credit. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175
(1901). It was formerly held that if the defendant appeared per-
sonally and denied that the plaintiff was a resident, but later with-
drew the answer that this did not preclude a finding by a court of
another state that plaintiff was not in fact a bona fide resident. An-
drews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). The Sherrer case expressly
overrules the Andrews case and establishes that litigation of the
jurisdictional issue prevents a later inquiry in another state into
the facts upon which jurisdiction was based. This does not mean
that a court of another state must recognize a divorce based upon
collusion or fraud.
The decision raises two questions. First, are there minimum
residence requirements for divorce so that a divorce granted on less
may be disregarded by a sister state? Bona fide residence has a
definite meaning, and when states characterize as bona fide resi-
dence a transiency that cannot logically be so classified, sister states
may disregard decrees based on that type of residence. Second,
what will be the decision where the defendant appears but does not
contest the allegation of residence? Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissenting opinion in the Sherrer case discerned this problem but
offered no solution. It is doubtful that a mock, or pre-arranged
contest of jurisdiction would be binding on the courts of another
state. The essence of the dissenting opinions in the Sherrer and
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Coe cases is that the public policy of states with strict residence
requirements is being defeated by states with more liberal stand-
ards.
Finally, a divorce decree does not necessarily affect the obliga-
tions imposed by a separation decree rendered in another state.
This result had been anticipated. Russo v. Russo, 62 N.Y.S. 2d
514 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946); Holt, The Bones of Haddock v. Haddock,
41 McH. L. REV. 1013, 1036 (1943). *The decision seems correct, but
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarks in his dissenting opinion, a
state may hold that a valid foreign decree does not terminate obli-
gations under a local separation decree only if it reaches the same
result as would have been reached had the divorce been granted by
the home state. Failure so to limit the decision is a weakness in the
majority opinion. The Coe and Estin cases both involved this
point. The Coe case held the payments under the prior decree
terminated while the Estin case did not. Comparison of the lan-
gauge in the two opinions indicates that the Court, without ex-
pressly so declaring, had in mind the limitation enunciated by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter.
Richard 0. Gantz
EQUITY-INJUNCTION DENIED--PRIATE AIRPORT AFFECTED
WI PUBLIC INTEREST
The defendant planned to build and operate a private, light-
plane airport on land about one-fourth mile from the corporation
limits of the city of Akron. Adjacent land owners in this unre-
stricted, unzoned area sought an injunction to restrain defendant
from so using his property. The trial court granted the injunction
and the case was appealed on questions of law and fact. Held, that
balanced against the defendant's establishment of a legitimate and
necessary business, the threatened damakes to the plaintiffs were
insufficient for an anticipatory injunction. Antonik v. Chamberlain,
81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E. 2d 752 (1947).
An airport is not a nuisance per se, although its manner of.
operation or construction may make it a nuisance. Thrasher v.
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Warren Township.School
District v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W. 2d 134 (1944) ; Vanderslice
v. Shawn, 27 A. 2d 87 (Del. Ch. 1942). In considering the airport
problem, as in other cases for injunctive relief from nuisance, the
courts have had to "balance the equities" of the parties in the light.
of the public policy involved.
In the clash between the private land owner and the expanding
aeronautic industry, the courts and legislature have recognized the
municipally owned airport as a public utility. Onto GEN. CODE
§§3677, 3939; State ex rel. Hie v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 265, 160
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N.E. 241 (1927); Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928);
Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 514, 11 S.W. 2d 1045 (1928). The public
interest has at least been considered in most of the cases involving
this type of airfield. One court took judicial notice of the airplane
as a "well nigh indispensable" public utility and refused to enjoin
an existirrg airport unless the acts were improper and unnecessary
to orderly conduct of the business. Thrasher v. Atlanta, supra; for
a similar holding see Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.
2d 245 (1942). When the University of Virginia applied to a state
commission for permission to build an airport, the courviewed the
public interest in aviation instruction as outweighing the opposition
of the owners of historic shrines in the area. Batcheller v. Virginia,
176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. 2d 529 (1940).
The present Ohio case seems to be one of the first to view the
enjoining of a private airport as a public' hardship. Other suits
concerning such airfields have usually ignored any public interest
therein-or said that none was involved. Gay v. Taylor, f9 Pa. D. &
C. 31, 1934 U.S. Av. R. 146 (1932); Vanderslice v. Shawn, supra;
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385
(1930); Burnham v. Beverly Airways Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.
2d 575 (1942). However, the Massachusetts cases are based on a
trespass theory which was rejected in the Ohio case.
Although the instant case seemingly lays greater stress on pub-
lic interest and comparative injury, it is reconcilable with a com-
parable Ohio case decided in the federal courts. Swetland v. Curtiss
Airports Corp., 41 F. 2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), modified 55 F. 2d 201
(C.C.A. 6th'1931). In thai case the, court said that the "balance
of cbnveniences" was against the airport owner because of the avail-
ability of an alternative site equally convenient to the community.
The actual result of the case under discussion follows the usual
rule -of denying injunctive relief where a threatened project is not
a nuisAnce per se and its subsequent use or operation will deter-
mine whether a nuisance will arise. This rule has been applied to
both public and private airports. Warren Township School District
v. Detroit, supra; Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 542, 58 A. 2d 179 (1948).
Since the decision in the principal case could have been reached
on a more traditional basis, the court's opinion may show a trend
in Ohio toward recognition of the private airport as a private enter-
prise affected with, a public interest.
Lloyd E. Fisher, Jr.
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JURISDICTION-REs JUDICATA-ERRONEOUS DECISION UPHOLDING
JUISDICTION ImMUNE FROM COLLATERAL ATTACK
An adtion for a partnership accounting was-brought in the Fed-
eral District Court foI the Territory of Hawaii by Menashe, a resi-
dent of Hawaii, against Sutton, a resident of New York, and a
receiver was appointed. MVfenashe then brought an action in the
district court in New york to hhve an ancillary receiver appointed.
A temporary appointment was made. Six months later this ap-
pointment was made permanent after the court had overruled a
motion to vacate the appointment for lack of jurisdiction. After
Sutton refused to disclose the location of the partnership assets
alleged to be in New York, he was committed for contempt of court
and sued out a writ of habeas corpus. Held,'although the district
court had no jurisdiction of the ancillary receivership, suit (because
the 1940 amendment to 28 U.S.C. §41 (1), which allows citizens of
territories to sue citizens of a state i federal courts, is unconsti-
tutional), the collateral attack on the district couts decision must
fail. Since the orders appointing the temporary and permanent
receivers were appealable, and since Sutton did not appeal from
either order, the issue 'of jurisdiction is immune from collateral
attack. United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 169 F. 2d 94
(C.C.A. 2.d 1948).
The case is a logical extension of the principle that a court has
authority to pass upon its own jurisdiction, and that its decree sus,
taining jurisdiction against attack, while open'to direct review, is
res judicata in a collateral action. This principle was first applied
to jurisdiction of the person. -Baldwin -v. Iowa Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). Ii 1938 it was decided that a determi.a-
tion of jurisdiction of the subject matter was res judicata. Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). In 1940 the principle -was further
extended so that res judicata might be pleaded as a bar not olily.As
to matters presented, but also as to any other available matter
which might have been litigated. Chicot County Drainage District
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371. (1940). The rule is effective to
bar a second action upon the same' claim between the same parties
,or those' in privity with them. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310
U.S. 381 (1940). In 1941 it was decided that the principle would
apply where an interlocutory order had been issued after the ques-
tion of jurisdiction had been litigated. United States v. Jaeger, 117
F. 2d 483 (C.C.A. 2d 1941). The Supreme Court failed to cite this
line of cases in deciding that an interlocutory order must be obeyed
until set aside by appropriate proceedings, appellate or otherwise:
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258
(1947). The decision could very well have extended to interlocu-
tory orders the principl that determination of jurisdiction is res
I-
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judicata and immune from collateral attack. The principal case
would seem to indicate that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit believes that the Supreme Court did not disapprove
of such an extension by their failure to state it in the Mine Workers
case.
Judge Clark, concurring in the principal case, wrote, "My law
school teachings were that a judgment showing on its face lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter was void for all purposes." But
he concluded that the trend established in the recent cases has led
to this decision.
In a dissenting opinion Judge Frank calls the application of the
principle of res judicata in this case a "silly adherence to techni-
calities." He also points out that if the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject matter, then Sutton could not waive the deficiency by
his inaction.
It does seem extraordinary that the court should hold that
Congress was unable to confer jurisdiction to decide cases between
a citizen of Hawaii and a citizen of a state, but that a party is pre-
cluded from attacking an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction, if
he fails to appeal. The central theme of the current view is that
a party should have one, and only one chance to have a review of
a matter decided.
Myron E. Reinman
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - CONVERSION BY DRAWEE BANK-
BOOK CREDIT TO PAYEES BY DRAWEE BANK DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PAYMENT
Plaintiff received two drafts drawn by Tyson Produce Company
on the defendant bank. The drafts were deposited at the Pioneer
Bank and thereafter forwarded to the defendant bank for collection.
These two banks had a written contract covering the handling of
accounts between them to the effect that all items received by either
bank were to be credited conditionally, subject to final payment,
and might be charged back at any time until the proceeds thereof
in money have been actually received. Such was also the customary
way of handling accounts between banks in this area. Following
their usual course of dealing, the defendant bank upon receipt of the
drafts notified Tyson Produce which brought to the bank a check
to cover the total amount of both drafts, and other items, and the
bank then surrendered the drafts. Appropriate book entries credit-
ing the Pioneer Bank and debiting Tyson Produce were made. A
few hours later the defendant bank discovered that the Tyson Pro-
duce credit account had been obtained by the use of fraudulent
drafts. The bank immediately returned to Tyson Produce its check
and received in return the drafts which were then sent to the
Pioneer Bank for "insufficient funds." Held, the defendant bank is
not liable for conversion of the drafts nor did the book credit given
to the Pioneer Bank amount to an irrevocable payment. Goeman v.
Live Stock National Bank, 29 N.W. 2d 528 (Iowa 1947).
Conversion is any act of dominion or control, wrongfully ex-
erted over the chattels of another in denial of his right thereto.
Talich v. Marvel, 115 Neb. 255, 212 N.W. 540 (1927); Ben Cooper
Motor Co. v. Amey, 143 Okla. 75, 287 Pac. 1017 (1930). "Negotiable
instruments" are chattels, and as such are subject to conversion.
State v. First National Bank, 38 N.M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728 (1934).
The court in the instant case thought that it would be difficult to
find dominion or control wrongfully exerted in denial of the plain-
tiff's rights, since there did not exist in the Tyson Produce account
sufficient funds to satisfy the drafts.
The other problem in the case, whether a book credit is an
irrevocable payment, is more difficult. When a bank has paid in
cash a check in misreliance upon the state of the drawer's account,
the great majority of cases at common law and under the N.I.L.
hold that it is a completed transaction which cannot be rescinded
except for fraud, or for mutual mistake. Just what is meant by a
mutual mistake is not always clear. In the following cases, in ac-
cord with the majority view, it was held that there was no mu-
tuality of mistake when the drawee bank made a mistake as to the
state of the drawer's account, even though the payee did not know
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that the drawer had insufficient funds. American National Bank
v. Miller, 229 U.S. 517 (1913); Riverside Bank v. First National
Bank, 74 Fed. 276 (C.C.A. 2d 1896). The minority view is that un-
der such conditions there is a mutual mistake. Grand Lodge v.
Towne, 136 Minn. 72, 161 N.W. 403 (1917); National Bank of Cali-
fornia v. Miner, 167 Cal. 532, 140 Pac. 27 (1914). The majority
cases also hold that the act of crediting the depositing customer
will be considered equivalent to an act of paying cash, and if there-
after, even on the same day, the bank ascertains that they have
made a mistake it will not affect the rights of the depositing cus-
tomer. First National Bank of Philadelphia v. National Park Bank
& Trust Co., 165 N.Y. Supp. 15, 100 Misc. 31 (1917); Union State
Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 224 Mo. App. 375, 18 S.W. 2d
93 (1929). There are conflicting cases on the sufficiency of a credit
entry constituting payment. National Gold Bank v. McDonald, 51
Cal. 64 (1875); Pollack v. Bank of Commerce, 168 Mo. App. 268, 151
S.W. 774 (1912); Akron Scrap Iron v. Guardian Savings and Trust
Co., 120 Ohio St. 120, 165 N.E. 2d 715 (1929).
Two cases have given full effect to a contract, similar to the
one in the instant case, whereby credit is given conditionally sub-
ject to a charge back upon the discovery of an insufficiency of funds.
Seaboard National Bank v. Central Trust & Savings Bank, 253 Pa.
412, 98 Atl. 607 (1916); Stephens v. First National Bank, 271 S.W.
395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). One reported case is contra. Hay v.
First National Bank, 244 Ill. App. 286 (1927).
In many states the legislatures have met the problem. The ma-
jority of the statutes have followed the Bank Collection Code Sec-
tion 3 which provides that a book credit shall be provisional, subject
to revocation at or before the end of the day on which the item is
deposited if the item is found not payable for any reason. When a
credit is given after banking hours revocation may be exercised
during the following business day. These states are Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin and Wyoming. Two states, Michigan and Oklahoma, go further
and permit a charge back at or before the end of the next business
day.
Charles M. Deitle
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIIENTS - STOP PAYMENT ORDERS -
VALIDITY OF STIPULATIONS - NEGLIGENCE AS BASIS OF
BANK'S LIABILITY
Plaintiff depositor ordered the defendant bank to stop payment
on a check. Defendant required plaintiff to sign a stipulation releas-
ing defendant from liability for payment through inadvertency or
oversight. Subsequently, defendant paid the check. Held, the pur-
ported release was void for want of consideration and as against
public policy. Case remanded to common pleas to try the issue of
defendant's negligence. Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio
St. 415, 79 N.E. 2d 119 (1948).
That a drawer of a bank check can order the drawee bank to
stop payment before it has been accepted, certified or presented for
payment is a proposition firmly anchored in the law. Kahn, Jr. v.
Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 20 N.E. 203 (1889) ; Hynicka v. Life Ins. Co.,
4 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 297, 310 (1906); Mahon Co. v. Huntington Na-
tional Bank, 62 Ohio App. 261, 23 N.E. 2d 638 (1939) ; Ozburn v. Corn
Exchange National Bank of Chicago, 208 Ill. App. 155 (1917);
Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wash. 150, 210 Pac.
499 (1922); Guild v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co., 122 Me.
514, 121 Atl. 13 (1923); Citizens Bank of Gans v. Mabray, 90 Okla.
63, 215 Pac. 1067 (1923) ; Laura Baker School v. Pflaum, 30 N.W. 2d
290 (Minn. 1947); 5 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 354 (1932); MORSE,
BANKS Am BANKING 882 (1928).
That a drawee after receiving the stop payment order pays at
his peril is equally well established. Pease and Owyer v. State Na-
tional Bank, 114 Tenn. 693, 88 S.W. 172 (1905); American Defense
Society v. Sherman National Bank, 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695 (1919) ;
Bank of Hamilton v. Williams, 147 Ga. 96, 90 S.E. 718 (1916) ; Hewitt
v. First National Bank, 113 Tex. 100, 252 S.W. 161 (1923); Wall v.
Franklin Trust Co., 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392 (1925); Gaita v. Windsor
Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203, reversing 232 N.Y. Supp. 748, 225
App. Div. 750 (1929); American National Bank v. Reed, 134 S.W. 2d
782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Carroll v. South Carolina National Bank,
45 S.E. 2d 729 (1947); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 1157
(6th ed. 1938); 5 MIcHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 359 (1932).
For an analysis of the bank's position if it fails to obey the
order, see 39 YALE L.J. 542, 543 (1929). The risk to the bank that a
wrongful payment will be made is substantial and the burden is
onerous. BRITTON, BILLS. AN NOTES 839 (1943); 39 YALE L.J. 542,
547 (1929).
This situation has caused the banks, as a matter of practice and
protection, to insist that the drawer sign a stipulation, the nature of
which varies with different banks, releasing the drawee from liabil-
ity. 15 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1926); 40 HARv. L. REV. 110 (1926). It is
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around these stipulations that the currents of conflict swirl. 39
YALE L. J. 542 (1929); 42 YALE L. J. 817, 840 (1932); 15 CoRN. L. Q.
256 (1929); 14 MnqN. L. REV. 172 (1929); 29 COL. L. REv. 1150 (1929);
35 MicH. L. REV. 1167 (1936); 15 CALIF. L. REV. 46 (1926).
Some jurisdictions permit the bank to extract these signed
stipulations from the drawer thereby making the stop payment
order conditional. Gaita v. Windsor Bank, supra, approved 15 CoRN.
L. Q. 256 (1929); 14 MINN. L. REV. 172 (1929); disapproved 29 COL.
L. REV. 1150 (1929); see notes, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1926); 35 MIcE.
L. REV. 1167 (1936); 39 YALE L. J. 542 (1929). Tremont Trust Co. v.
Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920); Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932); Edwards v. National City
Bank of New York, 150 Misc. 80, 269 N.Y. Supp. 637 (Mun. Ct. 1934);
Pyramid Musical Corp. v. Floral Park Bank, 268 App. Div. 783, 48
N.Y.S. 2d 866 (1944); Chase National Bank of City of New York
v. Battat, 78 N.E. 2d 465 (N.Y. 1948). See Mahon Co. v. Huntington
National Bank, supra at 265.
Other jurisdictions void these agreements on grounds of public
policy, but see 39 YALE L. J. 542, 544 (1929); or lack of consideration,
or both. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947
(1926); Grisinger v. Golden State Bank of Long Beach, 92 Cal. App.
443, 268 Pac. 425 (1928); Elder v. Franklin National Bank, 25 Misc.
716, 55 N.Y. Supp. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Levine v. Bank of United
States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N.Y. Supp. 108 (Mun. Ct. 1928).
It is interesting to note that originally these stipulations were
invalid in New York and valid in Ohio. Elder v. Franklin National
Bank, supra; Mahon Co. v. Huntington National Bank, supra. Today
the converse is true. Gaita v. Windsor Bank, supra; Speroff v. First-
Central Trust Co., supra.
To prohibit the stipulations places an unconditional obligation
upon the bank to stop payment. To permit the stipulations releases
the bank of all liability except wanton misconduct. Gaita v. Wind-
sor Bank, supra. It is submitted that the middle ground approach,
applied by the court in the instant case, is the best view. 23 COL.
L. REV. 780 (1923).
However, the test of negligence has been soundly criticized as
being too nebulous for the banking business. 39 YALE L. J. 542, 546
(1929). Nevertheless, the courts when faced with equally difficult
problems in other fields of human endeavor have managed to etch
some well defined lines in the sandy law of negligence.
Norman W. Shibley
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TORTS-SLANDER-WILLFUL VERBAL ABUSE NOT ACTIONABLE
Plaintiff's pleading alleged that the defendant in a loud voice
falsely and maliciously slandered plaintiff in a public place for
the purpose of causing her physical injury and that the remarks did
cause her physical injury because they were made at a time when
she was in advanced pregnancy. The trial court directed a verdict
on the grounds that the spoken words were not slander per se and
that an action for slander per quod does not lie unless special dam-
ages are pleaded. The court of appeals reversed, saying that de-
fendant must have anticipated that his conduct would result in
emotional disturbance and bodily injury, which would give the
plaintiff the right to go to the jury on the facts. Held, (4-3) pro-
fane and obnoxious epithets not amounting to slander, where such
epithets are unaccompanied by actions constituting an assault, are
at most damnum absque injuria and do not give rise to a cause of
action. Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735 (1948).
It has long been the rule in Ohio that there is no liability for
acts which cause fright or shock unaccompanied by physical injury
where the acts complained of are neither willful nor malicious.
Miller v. Baltimore &. Ohio R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908) ;
Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 53 Ohio St. 431, 41 N.E.
689 (1895). The qualification in the rule of the Miller case would
seem to imply that the court did not intend to deny recovery where
the acts complained of were either willful or malicious and physical
injury followed. That is the position taken by Judge Zimmerman
in his dissent. This view has been followed heretofore in Ohio.
Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Rosnagle, 84 Ohio St. 310, 95 N.E. 884
(1911) (infant plaintiff suffered injury from fright after being
wrongfully ejected from a street car on a dark night); Brownlee
v. Pratt, 77 Ohio App. 533, 68 N.E. 2d 798 (1946) (defendant inter-
fered with the interment of plaintiff's parents). Indeed, the court
has allowed recovery for physical injuries resulting from mental
suffering where the defendant's act was merely negligent. Wolfe
v. The Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E. 2d
230 (1944) ; Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
The majority opinion requires a traditional, technical tort on
which to hang damages, and holds that since the defendant's acts
were neither slander nor assault, the plaintiff has no cause of ac-
tion. This view has often been discredited. The majority cited a
line of Kentucky cases which denied recovery. But these were neg-
ligence cases, and in 1943 the Kentucky court said that where the
wrong is willful there may be recovery for mental pain and suffer-
ing as well as physical pain and suffering. Brown v. Crawford, 296
Ky. 249, 177 S.W. 2d 1 (1943). The technical tort used as a peg on
which to hang parasitic damages is often very slender. Stockwell
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v. Gee, 121 Okla. 207, 249 Pac. 389 (1926) (trespass on the property
of plaintiff's husband); Bouillon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 148 Mo.
App. 462, 129 S.W. 401 (1910) (a hand on the doorknob of plaintiff's
apartment); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188
S.E. 625 (1936) (threats by a bill collector from his car); Whitsel
v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916) (running toward the
plaintiff shaking his fist); Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac.
429 (1916) (a threat to shoot plaintiff's husband in her presence).
Included in the list of cases cited and supposedly distinguished by
the majority are cases in which it is hard to find a technical tres-
pass or assault. It was held that false charges of unchastity against
a schoolgirl accompanied by threats of reform school stated a cause
of action although the court said that it was doubtful if the facts
constituted an assault. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208
N.W. 814 (1926). Threatening collection letters sent willfully and
intentionally to produce mental pain and anguish have been held
actionable. LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457,
253 N.W. 424 (1934). The same result was reached where the letters
accused plaintiff of adultery and threatened arrest. Grimes v. Gates,
47 Vt. 594 (1873).
It was held that the right to recover for bodily pain and suffer-
ing resulting from fright which is caused by a willful wrong may
be regarded as established in Arkansas. Rogers v. Willard, 144 Ark.
587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920). The Georgia Court of Appeals indicated
that plaintiff would have been given a cause of action merely on
the basis of mental suffering, but they relied on a technical battery,
viz., that the defendant's agent threw a coin on plaintiff's bed.
Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 569, 193 S.E.
458 (1937). The Kansas Supreme Court said, ". . . defendant's lia-
bility does not depend on whether his wrongful onset constituted an
assault. Plaintifi'seeks to enforce a civil liability for the conse-
quences of the wrong and the general rule is that a wrongdoer is
liable in damages for injuries which are the natural and reasonable
consequences of his wrongful act whatever name may be fittingly
applied to the wrong." Whitsel v. Watts, supra at 509.
Judge Hart in an able dissent faces the problem squarely and
traces the historical background of the cases which have allowed
recovery for physical damage as a result of intentionally inflicted
mental suffering without attempting classification according to the
traditional pattern of torts. The doctrine contended for in this dis-
sent had its source in parasitic damages allowed for mental suffer-
ing. See, e.g., Smith v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry., 23
Ohio St. 10 (1872). Such damages have been allowed in Ohio where
the defendant's tort was willful or negligent. Rose Co. v. Lowery,
33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N.E. 716 (1929); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino,
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). But this practice does not
include the plaintiff in an action for wrongful death. Steel v. Kurtz,
28 Ohio St. 191 (1876).
A leading English case held a practical joker liable for damages
to a woman whom he falsely told that her husband was injured.
Wilkinson v. Downton, L.R. 2 Q.B. 57, 76 L.T. 493 (1897). This case
has been followed in similar situations. Bielitski v. Obadiak, 61
Dom. L. Rep. 494 (1921) (false report of a relative's suicide); At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22 (1930)
(delivering a dead rat in a grocery package); Nickerson v. Hodges,
146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920) (having plaintiff dig up a "pot of gold"
under extremely humiliating circumstances).
Usually the injured parties who recover are children or preg-
nant women, since it has only been in recent years that medical
science has been able to connect the mental injury with the physi-
cal damages in other than such obvious cases. But the adminis-
trator of a male adult recovered where the connection between the
act complained of and the death was plain enough. Rasmussen ;V.
Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 290 (1938).
Bill collectors, undertakers, private detectives, and insurance
adjusters have been the first defendants to feel the impact of this
doctrine. Barnett v. Collection Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25
(1932); Clark v. Credit Men's Association, 105 F. 2d 62 (App. D.C.
1939) (overbearing bill collectors); Gadbury v. Blietz, 133 Wash.
134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925) (undertaker withheld body from burial);
Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P. 2d
535 (1932) (unduly publicizing a funeral); Janvier v. Sweeny, 2 K.
B. 316, 88 L.J.K.B. 1231 (1919) (threats by private detectives);
Continental Casaulty Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753
(1935) (insurance adjuster).
It is possible that the doctrine supported by the two dissenting
opinions may yet become the law of Ohio, and that the court will
recognize the qualification of the rule of the Miller case that where
the actions complained of are willful and malicious, as distinguished
from negligent, recovery will be allowed for damages resulting
from mental suffering. "It is time to recognize that the courts have
created a new tort." Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffer-
ing: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
Louis E. Evans
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WILLS - EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF WRITTEN
INSTRUIENT AVERRING TESTAIENTARY CAPACITY
The evidence disclosed that the testator "was uneducated, had
the mind of a.. . child, enjoyed trading in live stock... [and] in-
vested all of his income in farm lands which he was able to suc-
cessfully manage with the assistance of others." Shortly before he
made his will, his interests in realty were increased by devise.
Relatives of the testator filed suits to partition lands in which he
had interests. The country was in the midst of the depression, and
the testator bitterly resented a forced sale of his holdings. Under
these conditions, he executed his will, giving a life estate in all his
properties to his sister and her husband, the remainder to be re-
duced to money and the proceeds to be divided between two
churches. Anticipating that his will would be contested, the testator
had prepared an instrument, signed by thirty-four of his acquaint-
ances and friends, consisting of bankers, business men, and farmers.
They certified that they knew the testator and had associated with
him for years, that they were certain he was capable of transacting
ordinary business, that he knew his relatives and his obligations to
them, and the nature and extent of his property, and that he was of
sound mind and was fully capable of making a will. This instru-
ment, antedating the will by four days, was offered in evidence
when the will was attacked on the grounds of mental incapacity and
undue influence. The evidence was rejected by the trial court. Held,
on appeal to the court of appeals, judgment reversed. "[The] evi-
dence . .. should have been admitted under proper instruction to
the jury, not as substantive proof of the facts therein contained, but
as possibly throwing some light upon his state of mind at that
time." Spidel v. Warrick, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 413 (Ct. of App. 1948).
In Ohio, testamentary capacity exists when the testator has
sufficient mind and memory (1) to understand the nature of the
business in which he is engaged, (2) to comprehend generally the
nature and extent of his property, (3) to hold in his mind the
names and identity of those who have natural claims upon his
bounty, and (4) to be able to appreciate his relation to the mem-
bers of his family. Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503
(1917). Testamentary capacity is determined as of the date of exe-
cution of the will. See Vrooman v. Powers, 47 Ohio St. 191, 195, 24
N.E. 267, 268 (1890). Evidence of the state of mind of the testator
within a reasonable time before the execution of the will is ad-
missible as throwing light on his testamentary capacity at the time
of execution. Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336
(1928). It is not competent, in a will contest, for a nonattesting,
nonexpert witness to give an opinion as to the capacity of the testa-
tor to make a will. Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 (1864). This is
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the usual rule. 7 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE §1958 (3d ed. 1940). But such
a witness may testify as to the capacity of the testator to transact
ordinary business. Niemes v. Niemes, supra, or to form a purpose
and intention of disposing of his property by will. Dunlap v. Dun-
lap, 89 Ohio St. 28, 104 N.E. 1006 (1913); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St.
416, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947).
In the instant case, the evidence was in the form of a written
instrument. The hearsay rule rejects assertions, offered testimoni-
ally, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of
cross-examination. 5 WIGmopE, EvmDEcE §1362 (3d ed. 1940).
However, a wide range of inquiry is permitted to bring before the
jury facts and influences bearing on the preparation of a will. Board
of Education v. Phillips, 103 Ohio St. 622, 626, 134 N.E. 646, 648
(1921). Therefore, the admission of the evidence is defensible.
From a practical standpoint, procuring the preparation of such a
written instrument would seem to be an eminently sensible method
of demonstrating testamentary capacity.
Robert J. Lynn
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